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I. COLLABORATION IN THE WEST

The West has always been a place of contrasts and conflicts. Questions
of how to allocate or manage natural resources have evolved to meet the
needs of the times. During an era of disposition, the federal government
gave away land and resources to encourage settlement in a cash-poor, but
land-rich America.1 After the closing of the frontier, a conservation-era
U.S. reserved public lands for forest reserves, national parks, and wildlife
refuges, and began to lease natural resources previously given away. 2 Conflict between competing users of public lands and natural resources remained the constant. More recently, preservation efforts embodied in the
* Juris Doctorate and Masters in Environmental Studies, The University of Montana, 2008.
1. See George Cameron Coggins, Charles F. Wilkinson, John D. Leshy & Robert L. Fischman,
FederalPublic Land and Resources Law 64-116 (6th ed., Foundation Press 2007).
2. See id. at 117-145.
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Wilderness Act 3 and the Endangered Species Act (ESA) 4 have been added
to the mix of competing uses of public lands. The Multiple-Use, SustainedYield Act 5 mandated multiple uses for national forests, while the National
Forest Management Act (NFMA) 6 attempted to balance multiple use and
diversity of plant and animal communities through forest planning. The
rest of the western story has played out against this backdrop, often framed
as jobs versus the environment, wise use versus biodiversity, Old West versus New West.7
But the New West is not easily defined. An economic shift from extractive to service industries is one key factor. Timber, grazing, and mining
uses of public lands now must compete with recreation, ecosystem services,
and biodiversity needs. Conflict is endemic among these competing demands on our public lands. Motorized and non-motorized recreational users fight over access. Loggers and conservationists frame timber harvests
as management tools to restore damaged ecosystems or threats to biodiversity. Ranchers and conservationists view wolf reintroduction as a threat to
a family lifestyle or a welcome balancing of native diversity. And this is
just the debate on public lands. At the same time, the New West faces unprecedented growth, with timber companies and ranching families increasingly selling and subdividing land to meet development demands. These
trends raise similar conflicts. Land use and water demands pit developers
against environmentalists on water
appropriations and critical habitat desig8
species.
endangered
for
nations
An elaborate legal framework has grown to address the needs of the
changing western landscape. Litigation, participation in forest planning,
lobbying, and public processes surrounding agency rulemaking are the tools
of choice for many attempting to influence public lands decision-making.
But another tool has gained increasing interest and attention: collaboration. 9
What is collaboration? Like the western landscape itself, the word
means many things to many people. Indeed much of the New West lexicon
involves such ambiguous terms: ecosystem management, adaptive management, sustainability, restoration. Few people would disagree with the
usefulness of people sitting down together to talk through their conflicts.
However, agreement over the collaborative concept quickly breaks down in
3. 16U.S.C.§§ 1131-1136(2006).
4. 16U.S.C.§§ 1531-1543.
5. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531.
6. 16U.S.C.§§ 1600-1614.
7. See Charles F. Wilkinson, Crossing the Next Meridian: Land, Water, and the Future of the
West (Island Press 1992); Robert B. Keiter, Keeping Faith with Nature: Ecosystems, Democracy, &
America's Public Lands (Yale U. Press 2003).
8. See Keiter, supra n. 7, at 219-310.
9. Id.; Across the Great Divide: Explorations in Collaborative Conservation and the American
West (Philip Brick, Donald Snow & Sarah Van de Wetering eds., Island Press 2001).
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the details. Who sits at the table? How are such agreements enforced?
What roles do the parties play? Who ultimately decides? What legal
framework applies? How do you judge success?' °
I personally have struggled with some of these questions through my experiences facilitating collaborative efforts to resolve environmental disputes. In the Peace Corps in Nicaragua, I worked to mediate an agreement
between a national park seeking to protect its forest resources and a local
community that depended on fuel wood extracted from the park to cook
their meals. At the Environmental Protection Agency, I facilitated working
group meetings of various agency and community members to create a
transparent decision-making process for Superfund cleanups of contaminants in residential neighborhoods. These experiences were contentious but
real. People were not fighting over abstract concepts, but over their direct
needs of survival and health. Relationships grew and understanding developed. These collaborative processes had varying degrees of success, but
they ingrained in me a sense of what is possible and a belief that process
can be as important as results.
I continued this exploration of collaborative conservation in Montana. A
few years ago I interviewed about a dozen Montana environmentalists
about their experiences with collaboration. As expected, collaboration
meant different things to different people and was alternately viewed as the
promise of a better future or an illegal undermining of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). One project in particular was frequently
mentioned in divergent terms ranging from a model of success to an example of everything wrong with collaboration. That project is the BeaverheadDeerlodge Partnership (BDP or Partnership)."
This article is an attempt to reconcile these various perspectives on the
Beaverhead-Deerlodge Partnership and analyze its substantive and procedural achievements. My analysis covers both legal and practical considerations in assessing, to borrow a western metaphor, the good, the bad, and the
ugly aspects of the Partnership. While I make every effort to explore all
sides of the issues raised, my assessment is rooted in an ecological perspective. The essential question I ask is whether the Beaverhead-Deerlodge
Partnership is good environmental policy for the forest. It has been said
that a good compromise leaves all equally dissatisfied. While that may be
true, my question is whether the environmental dissatisfaction is worth the
price. Various interests are incorporated into the Partnership Strategy, but
my analysis seeks to explore the conflict within the conservation community, rather than among competing interests seeking their piece of the public
land pie.

10. See Keiter, supra n. 7, at 219-310.
I I. See Beaverhead-Deerlodge Partnership, http://www.bhdlpartnership.org (accessed May 15,
2008).
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My goal is to critique the evolving collaborative approach to public land
management, as embodied in the proposed Partnership Strategy, from legal,
environmental, policy, and democratic accountability perspectives. This
critique should give the reader a better understanding of the strengths,
weaknesses, and limits of the Partnership as a potential means for reducing
public lands conflict and promoting a more ecologically sustainable approach to accommodating multiple uses of our public lands.
This article begins by exploring collaborative conservation generally and
then applies that framework to the BDP. In part II, I examine what collaboration is, its benefits, and some examples. In part III, I discuss the legality
of collaboration. Part IV evaluates collaboration by exploring critiques and
criteria for success. This lays the groundwork for an analysis of the Partnership as collaboration. My analysis in part V examines substantive issues
of wilderness, forest restoration, and legal frameworks. Part V also examines procedural issues such as whether the BDP is a genuine collaboration,
implementation of the BDP Strategy, and the scope of interests considered.
Finally, I conclude in part VI with a forward-looking assessment of the
overall success of the Partnership.
1]. WHAT IS COLLABORATION?

A. Defining Collaboration
Collaboration has nearly as many names as definitions. Collaborative
conservation, cooperative conservation, environmental conflict resolution,
multi-party negotiations, and consensus-building are all variations on the
collaborative theme. Not surprisingly, the definitions further illustrate this
diversity.
American Lands Alliance developed CollaborationBest Practicesfor the
Conservation Community with input from 69 conservation leaders from
around the country at a November 2006 National Meeting on Collaboration. 2 The Best Practicesdescribes collaboration as:
diverse interests coming together to work toward a common goal. Collaborations may involve negotiations, but
the collaborative must have come together around common
goals or a shared purpose. True collaborations must be
open, transparent, inclusive, accessible, and strive for balanced representation. Collaboration does not preclude ad3
vocacy, organizing or litigation by the participants.'

12. American Lands Alliance and Participants of the National Meeting on Collaboration, Collaboration Best Practices for the Conservation Community, http://www.americanlands.org/issues.php?
subsubNo=l 148069142 (March 2007) [hereinafter Best Practices].
13. Id. at 2.
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The Best Practices cautions that collaboration does not replace NEPA or
other environmental laws and does not include "[n]egotiated political deals
(i.e. public land legislation), behind closed doors deal making, or other
processes that are not open, transparent, and strive to be inclusive.... "'14
The Western Collaboration Assistance Network defines collaboration as
"a voluntary process through which a broad array of interests, some of
which may be in conflict, enter into civil dialogue to collectively consider
possible recommendations and actions that improve the management of
natural 1resources
to benefit both the environment and surrounding commu5
nities."'
A collection of essays exploring collaborative conservation in the West
offers this definition:
[C]ollaborative conservation emphasizes the importance of
local participation, sustainable natural and human communities, inclusion of disempowered voices, and voluntary
consent and compliance rather than enforcement by legal
and regulatory coercion. In short, collaborative conservation reaches across the great divide connecting preservation
advocates and developers, commodity producers and conservation biologists, local residents, and national interest
groups to find working solutions to intractable problems
that will surely languish
unresolved for decades in the ex6
system.1
policy
isting
Some common themes that emerge from these definitions are that collaborations involve diverse interests based on common goals. Collaborations are voluntary and serve as one of many tools to meet conservation
goals. True collaborations are open, transparent, inclusive, and accountable, which helps build trust and credibility. Collaborations are usually
advisory.
B. Why Collaborate?
The authors of Making Collaboration Work 17 evaluated the role of collaboration in natural resource management, based on almost a decade of
research "focused on learning how people have worked together successfully to solve common problems, resolve conflicts, and build partnerships in

14.

Id.

15. Western Collaboration Assistance Network, What is Collaboration and Why Try It?
http://westcanhelp.org/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=3&Itemid=7 (accessed May 15,
2008).
16. Donald Snow, Coming Home: An Introduction to Collaborative Conservation, in Across the
Great Divide, supra n. 9, at 2 (quoting Phil Brick and Sarah Van de Wetering).
17. Julia M. Wondolleck & Steven L. Yaffee, Making Collaboration Work: Lessons from Innovation in Natural Resource Management (Island Press 2000).
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order to move their communities and agencies toward a more sustainable
direction."' 8 Their simple answer to the question of why collaborate is that
"[c]ollaboration can lead to better decisions that are more likely to be implemented and, at the same time, better prepare agencies and communities
for future challenges."' 9 The longer answer is that collaboration builds
understanding through information sharing, which allows agencies to learn
from and educate the public and manage uncertainty through joint research
and fact-finding. 20 Collaboration also facilitates wiser decision-making by
solving common problems, resolving disputes, and building support for
decisions. 2 1 Similarly, collaboration helps get work done by coordinating22
efforts, sharing management responsibility, and mobilizing resources.
Finally, collaboration strengthens agencies, organizations, and communities
23
by building staff capabilities and promoting community development.
The Western Collaboration Assistance Network describes the following
potential benefits of working collaboratively:
* Better decisions about challenging projects that are
more likely to be implemented;
" Increased public participation and support for management actions;
" Opportunities for information sharing and mutual learning;
* Enhanced understanding of community issues and legal
and management restraints;
* Innovative approaches;
" Possible financial savings due to pooling of resources;
" Preparation of agencies and communities for future
challenges. 24
Thus, some of the benefits of collaboration include better decisions, more
likely implementation, information sharing, improved understanding among
parties, and innovative solutions.
C. Some CollaborativeExamples
Perhaps more useful than abstract definitions or general benefits is a brief
discussion of some representative case studies in collaboration. 5
18. Id.
at xi.
19. Id. at 23.
20. Id. at 24-30.
21. Id. at 30-35.
22. Id. at 36-41.
23. Id. at41-45.
24. Western Collaboration Assistance Network, What is Collaboration and Why Try It?
http://westcanhelp.org/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id=3&ltemid=7 (accessed May 15,
2008).
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The Quincy Library Group (QLG) succeeded in implementing much of
their consensus-based forest strategy through national legislation.2 6 The
QLG consists of timber interests, local environmentalists, citizens, and local
government representatives from California's northern Sierra Nevada. The
effort began in 1986 as a local environmental proposal to protect remaining
roadless lands and restrict logging to second-growth land with existing
roads. The Forest Service considered, but rejected, the alternative during
forest plan revisions. However, when timber sales declined and the Forest
Service imposed regulations to protect the California spotted owl, the local
timber industry approached the environmentalists. What followed was a
series of meetings at the Quincy Library culminating in a plan with something for everybody, including timber access, jobs, fire protection, preservation of roadless areas, riparian protections, and an end to large clear-cuts.
But the Forest Service did not implement the plan in the next years, and the
QLG began lobbying Congress to implement the plan directly. National
environmental groups resisted this legislative approach that could set a
precedent of piecemeal forest legislation overriding environmental laws.
Some of these concerns were addressed by Congress when it passed the
Quincy Library Group Forest Recovery and Economic Stability Act, which
required the Forest Service to follow federal laws as well as California spotted owl protections. The Forest Service reduced the available timber base
in the Quincy proposal through two environmental impact statements (EIS)
in order to protect California spotted owl habitat. This move met some of
the national environmental groups' concerns, but angered the QLG by diminishing the project's economic feasibility. Thus, the QLG succeeded in
implementing a watered-down version of their forest strategy through national legislation.27
Another model of collaboration is the Malpai Borderlands Group. Concerned ranchers formed the Malpai Borderlands Group to bring ranchers,
scientists, and key agencies together in a large experiment in ecosystem
28
management along the New Mexico and Arizona border with Mexico.
The non-profit group's mission is to "restore and maintain the natural processes that create and protect a healthy, unfragmented landscape to support a
diverse, flourishing community of human, plant and animal life in our bor25. The examples discussed here are nationally recognized collaborations. Some Montana collaborative examples include: the Blackfoot Challenge, Three Rivers Challenge, and the BeaverheadDeerlodge Partnership (discussed in Part V). See Tim Mahoney, Wilderness and Community Forestry:
Opportunity for a New Generation (Oct. 11,2007); Red Lodge Clearinghouse, Blackfoot Challenge,
http://rlch.org/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=179&ltemid=36 (last updated Jan. 16,
2008).
26. Ed Marston, The Quincy Library Group: A Divisive Attempt at Peace, in Across the Great
Divide, supra n. 9, at 79-90; Keiter, supra n. 7, at 274-299.
27. Marston, supra n. 26; Keiter, supra n. 7, at 274-299.
28. Kelly Cash, Malpai Borderlands: The Searchers for Common Ground, in Across the Great
Divide, supra n. 9, at 112-121; Malpai Borderlands Group, http://www.malpaiborderlandsgroup.org/
(last updated Feb. 20, 2008).
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derlands region., 29 The Malpai Borderlands Group's approach is to work
together to "encourage profitable ranching and other traditional livelihoods,
which will sustain the open space nature of our land for generations to
come." 30 Through front porch meetings and fortuitous relationships, the
Malpai Borderlands Group succeeded in facilitating The Nature Conservancy's sale of the Gray Ranch to a local conservation-minded rancher,
implementing prescribed burns on public and private lands, and assisting
efforts to protect threatened species like the Chiricahua leopard frog. The
Malpai Borderlands Group's common agenda has secured one million acres
of open space in cooperative conservation ownership, protection and reintroduction of various species, 200 permanent monitoring sites to gather
information on ecosystem health, and conservation programs, such as land
3
restoration and cost-sharing range improvements. 1
The Applegate Partnership in Oregon is a watershed group involving
conservation organizations, industry, natural resource agencies, and residents "cooperating to encourage and facilitate the use of natural resource
principles that promote ecosystem health and diversity. ' 32 The Applegate
Partnership's mission statement reads: "Through community involvement
and education, this partnership supports management of all land within the
watershed in a matter that sustains natural resources and that will, in turn,
contribute to economic and community well-being and resilience."3 3 The
Partnership grew from discussions between environmentalist Jack Shipley
and logger Jack Neal about collaborative land management after the timber
industry's economic slump in the early 1990s. 34 Seeking to overcome gridlock and conflict between special interests in southwest Oregon, they began
a series of roundtable discussions to address forest management issues.
They invited farmers, ranchers, environmentalists, loggers, agency officials,
and local residents who shared the watershed to find common ground. The
resulting Applegate Partnership's goal was to improve natural resource
management through consensus and a stable local economy. The Applegate Partnership worked with federal land management agencies to advance
watershed planning projects, including innovative timber sales that incorporated best management practices for reducing fire risks and enhancing forest health. The Partnership served as a model for Adaptive Management
29. Malpai Borderlands Group, http://www.malpaiborderlandsgroup.org/ (last updated Feb. 20,
2008).
30. Id.
31. Cash, supra n. 28, at 112-121; Malpai Borderlands Group, http://www.malpaibor
derlandsgroup.org/ (last updated Feb. 20, 2008).
32. Applegate Partnership and Applegate River Watershed Council, http://www.arwc.org/
aboutus.html (accessed May 15, 2008).
33. Id.
34. Cassandra Moseley, The Applegate Partnership: Innovation in Crisis, in Across the Great
Divide, supra n. 9, at 102-111;
Red Lodge Clearinghouse, Applegate
Partnership,

http://rlch.org/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id=96&ltemid=36
2008).

(last updated Mar. 19,
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Areas, received Forest Service grants to monitor forest responses to different management treatments, completed a community Fire Protection Strat35
egy, and restructured a private land ditch system to allow fish migration.
The Partnership experienced some internal tension when some environmental organizations resigned over fears of weakening environmental laws
and differences in decision-making processes. Federal agencies also resigned after a timber industry suit found Federal Advisory Committee Act
(FACA)36violations, which caused further changes in direction for the Partnership.
This brief survey of some of the most widely referenced collaborative
conservation efforts demonstrates some common themes. Successful collaborations involve a wide range of interests, are usually initiated by locals,
and seek to find common ground. Most approaches combine private and
public efforts to achieve ecosystem management goals.
Following the Quincy Library Group model, negotiated public lands legislation has become an increasingly common method for overcoming the
inertia of public lands conflict. 37 As efforts to designate wilderness areas
throughout western states increasingly failed, collaborative approaches
combined conservation designations with local economic development.38
Some common themes to successful collaborative public lands legislation
are strong congressional leadership, lengthy and complex conflicts that are
not adequately resolved through administrative or judicial action, and a
commitment by parties to deliberate compromise before pursuing legislation. 39 However, the inertia of conflict can also undermine collaborative
efforts since many parties might believe that their interests
will be best
4
served through other approaches requiring less compromise. 0
III. Is COLLABORATION LEGAL?
The threshold inquiry into collaborative conservation is whether it is legal. Not surprisingly, the answer depends on what kind of collaborative
process is involved. Some environmental laws, such as the Clean Air Act
and Clean Water Act, require some cooperative conservation processes,
while many other environmental laws, such as NEPA, NFMA, and ESA,
require public participation and interagency coordination. 4' Other laws that
encourage cooperative conservation include the Negotiated Rulemaking
35. Red Lodge Clearinghouse, Applegate Partnership, http://rlch.org/index.php?option=com
content&task=view&id=96&ltemid=36 (last updated Mar. 19, 2008).
36. Moseley, supra n. 34, at 106-108.
37. Western Governors' Association White Paper, CollaborativeConservation Strategies: Legislative Case Studiesfrom Across the West (June 2006).
38. Id. at31.
39. Id. at 31-32.
40. Id. at 33.
41. Sarah Bates Van de Wetering, The Legal Framework for Cooperative Conservation 9, 11
(Public Policy Research Institute The University of Montana 2006).
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Act of 1989, Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990, and President
Bush's Executive Order 13352, "Facilitation of Cooperative Conservation. ,,42 However, there is a tension between collaboration and open government principles. For example, FACA creates strict procedures for how
federal agencies may assemble, convene, and receive recommendations
from non-governmental advisory groups. 4 3 This has led some federal agencies to avoid contact with nonfederal entities out of fear of FACA suits.
This "FACA-phobia" can discourage collaborative conservation or minimize agency participation in collaborative efforts. 44
Despite some explicit legal support for collaborative conservation, the
flexible nature of collaboration raises a number of additional legal issues.
Under the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, Congress may
delegate authority to agencies to fill in details of its statutes, provided Congress guides agency action through "an intelligible principle. ' '45 However,
agencies may not "subdelegate" their authority to others. 46 "Most importantly, a federal agency may not fully shift its administrative responsibilities
to third parties, but always must retain final decision-making authority over
the public resources that are its responsibility. Further, any management
sharing must be consistent with the governing statutes and must ensure that
there are no conflicts of interest among participants. '"47 The Niobrara Scenic River Advisory Council is an example of a collaborative group that
overstepped subdelegation limits on authority because the National Park
Service (NPS) shared decision-making power with a private group. 4 8 However, the Columbia River Gorge Commission, a partnership of federal
agencies, states, and local governments working together on land use planning issues in a designated National Scenic Area, withstood constitutional
challenge.49 Another approach to avoid subdelegation issues is for Congress to delegate authority to new entities to achieve defined management
objectives, such as the Valles Caldera Trust, which Congress authorized to
50
manage the Valles Caldera National Preserve in New Mexico.
Most collaboratives evolve more organically from the ground up, which
raises slightly different legal questions. Such collaboratives may avoid
FACA conflicts by not actively involving federal agencies. Additionally,
such collaboratives do not face legal obstacles of open government and
public participation laws. Legal issues arise, however, when these collaboratives seek to implement their strategies. This is when privately negotiated
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 10.
Id.at13-15.
Id.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id.
Nod. Parks & Conserv. Assn. v. Stanton, 54 F.Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 1999).
Columbia River Gorge United v. Yeutter, 960 F.2d 110 (9th Cir. 1992).
Van de Wetering, supra n.41, at17-18.
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deals collide with agency process and all of the discussed legal requirements. Generally, collaboratives have attempted to implement their strategies in two manners.
First, collaboratives may attempt to influence existing agency decisionmaking processes, such as forest planning or environmental analysis. For
example, a group of various interests may create a mutually acceptable alternative that it presents to the land management agency to consider in its
forest planning process or NEPA analysis. While the collaborative has recommended an approach to the agency, the decision-making process is still
open to the public at large and controlled by applicable laws. Thus, no subdelegation problems arise and legally defined processes are followed.
Another approach is for a collaborative to present its strategy directly to
Congress to enact through specific legislation. Such negotiated omnibus
public lands legislation is most common when wilderness designations are
involved, which require congressional designation. This approach avoids
legal problems because any group may freely lobby Congress to enact legislation in its interest. The public process is essentially shifted to the political process, rather than an agency decision-making process. Such approaches have raised questions regarding the interaction of place-based
legislation with other federal laws, in particular whether specific legislative
directives to implement a local plan can supersede other environmental
laws. This question will be explored in more detail below.
IV. EVALUATING COLLABORATION

In order to evaluate the collaborative efforts of the BeaverheadDeerlodge Partnership, it is first necessary to evaluate collaboration generally. This evaluation will examine some critiques of collaboration and explore possible criteria for successful collaboration.
A. Critiques of Collaboration
One vocal critic of collaborative processes is George Cameron Coggins
who argues that devolution of federal land responsibilities to local collaborative processes is an illegal "abdication of legal management responsibilities by federal land managers." 51 Coggins argues that "[t]he appropriate
level of management decision making concerning public resources is a policy or political problem, not a legal question, because the law is settled. 52
Coggins argues that the Constitution delegates power over federal lands
exclusively to Congress, while Congress has in turn delegated that power,
with substantive and procedural limits, to four main federal land manage51. George Cameron Coggins, "Devolution" in Federal Land Law: Abdication by Any Other
Name, 14 Hastings W.-N.W. J. Envtl. L. & Policy 485,486 (2008).
52. George Cameron Coggins, Regulating FederalNatural Resources: A Summary Case Against
Devolved Collaboration,25 Ecol. L.Q. 602 (1999).
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ment agencies that must make final decisions, subject to judicial review and
legislative override. 53 Coggins contrasts this legally defined system of
separation of powers with devolved collaboration:
[t]he underlying theory is that a self-selected group of local
people who promise to be civil with one another can do a
better job of allocating federal natural resources than the
duly constituted federal authorities. Many federal bureaucrats are enthusiastic about this kind of private process because it is an all-purpose method of passing the buck on
difficult and controversial allocation issues.54
"But national lands are not private lands, and allocation of national resources is not a local issue. Ownership does matter. When the subject is
every American's natural heritage, devolved local collaborationism is entirely inappropriate. 5 5 Coggins argues "[d]evolved collaboration as currently advocated crosses the line at which judicial deference insulates
agency irresponsibility from reversal. Every pertinent statute says that the
Secretary or an agency, not local citizens, shall decide the allocation questions. No statute authorizes abdication of the authority. It is illegal. Period. 56
Coggins argues that many premises underlying collaboration are unproven or untrue. First, the underlying assumption that "all participants are
reasonable people who will see all sides of an issue and reach appropriate,
mutually acceptable compromises ... is demonstrably false. ' 57 "The West
is home to a disproportionate number of every kind of obdurate extremist,
demagogue, and outright crook. Reasoned discourse with them will be
unavailing., 58 Coggins also questions the assumption that agreement or
consensus is possible, noting that often values, premises, interests, and ideologies are strong, irreconcilably different, and unlikely to change by talking. 59 Coggins further questions the assumption that everybody wins in a
collaboration, noting that distribution of losses is more likely given past
resource damage. 60 Coggins challenges the assumption that allocation and
conservation of federal lands and resources are "local problems better
solved by local people with knowledge of local conditions," noting that
public resources allocation is a value question that should be resolved by
53. Id.
54. Id. at 603.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 606.
57. Id. at 607.
58. Id.
59. Id.; George Cameron Coggins, Of Californicators, Quislings, and Crazies: Some Perils of
Devolved Collaboration, in Across the Great Divide, supra n. 9, at 166 [hereinafter Coggins, Across the
Great Divide].
60. Coggins, supra n. 52, at 607; Coggins, Across the Great Divide, supra n. 59, at 167.
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the legitimate political process.6' Similarly, Coggins dismisses the premise
that all legitimate voices are heard in a collaboration, noting that some
groups intentionally exclude outside interests, even though there are no
outside interests when public lands and resources are at stake. 62
Coggins argues that as a matter of policy, collaboration can be a mask for
cooptation and may interfere with national priorities. Noting that national
conservation groups increasingly oppose local collaborations for being exclusive, time-wasting, futile, and resulting in no precedents, Coggins suggests that declining western economic interests use collaboration to forestall
more radical legal reforms, as evidenced by collaboratives' emphasis on
vague concepts such as "community," "lifestyle," and "custom and culture"
to preserve the status quo. 63 Another related issue is the conflict between
national and local priorities. "The federal lands are national assets, not local fiefdoms. The public natural resources belong to the entire American
public; they are not just local storehouses to be looted in the deregulation
riots." 64 Congress has legislated federal procedural requirements and substantive standards for land management agencies to follow in allocating
such national assets.65 Such processes are legally required and override
contrary local decisions. 66 Additionally, local collaboration cannot effectively address the magnitude of ecosystem-scale management that implicates multiple jurisdictions, agencies, parties, and remedies. 67 "Land-use
68
planning for federal land tracts must embrace more than local concerns,,
Coggins' overall point is that collaboration is illegal abdication of authority, and while the legally required decision-making process is imperfect, the process is fundamentally sound and produces decisions consistent
with law and public preference. 69 "Instead of allowing federal land managers to devolve their authorities and responsibilities onto local citizens'
councils, a far better balance will be achieved if only legislators would legislate, judges would judge, and managers would manage in accordance with
law." 7 °

Robert Keiter makes a more optimistic critique of collaboration. Keiter
identifies five governing principles, both procedural and substantive, for a
viable and legitimate community-based collaborative initiative: fairness,
equity, accountability, sustainability, and scientific integrity. 7' Procedurally, fairness and equity require inclusive processes that involve all in61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Coggins, Across the Great Divide, supra n. 59, at 167.
Coggins, supra n. 52, at 607.
Id. at 607-608; Coggins, Across the Great Divide, supra n. 59, at 168.
Coggins, Across the Great Divide, supra n. 59, at 169.
Id.; Coggins, supra n. 52, at 608.
Coggins, Across the Great Divide, supra n. 59, at 170.
Id.

68.

Id.

69. Id. at 170-171; Coggins, supra n. 52, at 610.
70.

Coggins, Across the Great Divide, supra n. 59, at 171.

71.

Keiter, supra n. 7, at 248-249.
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terests and operate openly and transparently. This builds trust and fosters
new and innovative solutions. Accountability, in both political and legal
terms, requires public land outcomes to be assessed from both national and
local perspectives and comply with governing federal laws. Substantively,
collaborations should produce sustainable results with lasting environmental benefits that also meet community needs. Such long-term results
should be measured over time by monitoring whether goals are met and
revised as necessary. Credible science can set baseline requirements, define
risk thresholds, or provide information regarding potential opportunities or
consequences.72
Michael McCloskey, former chairman of the Sierra Club, questions many
of the claimed advantages of collaboration, such as better decisions, improved processes, and building trust and acceptance. 3 McCloskey suggests
that consensus-building leads to lowest common denominator compromises, time consuming and wearing processes, and little reduction in political resistance or litigation.74 He argues that representative democracy is
undermined by local consensus processes where minorities can veto outcomes and subject national issues to local communities' decisions.75 As an
alternative to collaboration, McCloskey suggests that public participation
better serves the public interest, especially when stakeholder discussions are
regarded as input rather than finished policy, local interests are balanced
with state and national interests, and majority decisions replace consensus
rules.76
B. Criteriafor Evaluating Collaboration
One of the most difficult challenges of collaboration is evaluating its
success. Opinions abound regarding particular collaborative efforts, but
finding objective and measurable criteria for evaluation is more elusive.
The above critiques offer some guiding principles. The following are some
additional criteria.
The conservation community's Collaboration Best Practices outlines
some evaluative criteria.
The Best Practices lists openness, inclusion,
transparency, accessibility, balanced and diverse representation of interests,
focus on common goals, application of NEPA and other relevant laws, use
of best available science, maintaining participant independence to advocate
for goals in other forums, consensus decision-making, and actively seeking

72. Id.
73. Michael McCloskey, Problems with Using Collaboration to Shape Environmental Public
Policy, 34 Val. U. L. Rev. 423, 427-428 (2000).
74. Id. at 428-430.
75. Id. at 430-432.
76. Id. at 432-434.
77. Best Practices, supra n. 12.
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broader input as necessities for collaborative processes.78 They also suggest
independent facilitation,
long-term monitoring of results, and initiation by
79
non-agency groups.

One academic survey compiled lessons from roughly 200 collaborative
initiatives working over a decade to conclude that successful collaborative
efforts build on common ground; create new opportunities for diverse
groups to interact; focus on problems in innovative ways; foster responsibility, ownership, and commitment; recognize people rather than institutions;
are proactive; and mobilize resources and support from varied sources.'s
V. THE BEAVERHEAD-DEERLODGE PARTNERSHIP:
THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY

The Beaverhead-Deerlodge Partnership grew from a non-traditional response to forest planning. 8 1 The Forest Service's 2005 draft land and resource management plan for the Beaverhead-Deerlodge National Forest
(BDNF) stirred disappointment among some conservation groups and timber companies. Timber companies were concerned over proposed reductions in the suitable timber base on the forest, while conservation
groups
82
wanted greater habitat protections and forest restoration.
Early in 2006, leaders from the National Wildlife Federation, Montana
Wilderness Association (MWA), and Montana Trout Unlimited began a
three month series of meetings with the leadership of Sun Mountain Lumber and other timber companies to explore potential areas of agreement for
a comprehensive management strategy for the BDNF. The April 2006
Beaverhead-Deerlodge Partnership Strategy (BDP Strategy or Strategy)
proposed to connect timber harvest with forest restoration through stewardship contracts, while increasing designated wilderness. The Strategy
en83
dorsed motorized activities on over a million acres of the forest.
Disappointed with progress during the Forest Service's forest planning
process, and aware of the fact that wilderness designation requires congressional approval, the Partnership drafted legislation, the BeaverheadDeerlodge Conservation, Restoration and Stewardship Act (BDP Bill or
Bill), to implement their Strategy in 2007. 84
The Partners met with political leaders, organizations, and businesses in
the area to build support for their Strategy. The Partnership received letters
78. Id. at 2-3.
79. Id. at 3.
80. Wondolleck, supra n. 17, at 20-21.
81. Beaverhead-Deerlodge Partnership, About the Partnership, http://www.bhdipartnership.org/
partners.htm (accessed April 15, 2008).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Beaverhead-Deerlodge Partnership, Revised Draft Beaverhead-Deerlodge Conservation, Restoration and Stewardship Act of 2007, http://www.bhdlpartnership.org/legislation.htm (Oct. 9, 2007)
(there is no congressional bill number at this time) [hereinafter BDP Bill].
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of support from Governor Brian Schweitzer, Senator Max Baucus, and8 a5
number of county commissioners, unions, and conservation organizations.
The Partnership conducted outreach to numerous county commissions, recreation groups, business interests, conservation groups, watershed groups,
civic organizations, organized labor, and state and federal government representatives, and the Partnership presented their Strategy in many different
settings. 86 The Partnership also garnered some editorial support in the Mis87
soulian and Montana Standard.
The Partnership raises a number of unique issues, both substantive and
procedural. The discussion below explores many of these issues in an effort to evaluate the potential success of this collaborative effort. Substantively, the discussion focuses on whether the Partnership Strategy may successfully contribute to viable and sustainable ecological preservation and
restoration of public lands on the BDNF. Procedurally, the discussion examines whether the Partnership represents a genuine collaborative effort at
achieving these goals. My discussion explores the good, the bad, and the
ugly aspects of the issues raised by the Partnership Strategy.
A. Substantive Issues
The main substantive issues advanced in support of the BDP Strategy are
new wilderness designations and forest restoration through stewardship
contracting. My evaluation of the BDP Strategy starts with these substantive claims of success.
1. Wilderness
The BDP Bill would designate approximately 573,000 acres of new wilderness in 16 areas on the Beaverhead-Deerlodge National Forest in Montana. 88 Protecting wildlands in Montana would be a significant conservation achievement, especially considering that Montana has not had a new
wilderness designation in 25 years. 89 In comparison, the Forest Service's
preferred alternative for its revised forest plan would recommend 329,000
acres for wilderness designation. 90 This wilderness centerpiece to the BDP
would be good for the ecological sustainability of the forest.

85. Beaverhead-Deerlodge Partnership, Supporters, http://www.bhdlpartnership.org/supporters.htm
(accessed April 15, 2008).
86. Beaverhead-Deerlodge Partnership, Beaverhead-Deerlodge Partnership Powerpoint Presentation 15-16, http://www.bhdlpartnership.org/powerpoint.html (Jan. 17, 2008).
87. Beaverhead-Deerlodge Partnership, Press, http://www.bhdipartnership.org/press.htm (accessed
April 15, 2008).
88. BDP Bill, supra n. 84, at § 201.
89. The Lee Metcalf Wilderness, designated in 1983, was the last successful wilderness enactment
in Montana.
90.

Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Beaverhead-Deerlodge National Forest Land

and Resource Management Plan I (USFS Jan. 2008) [hereinafter BDNF FEIS].
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Critics, including some members of the conservation groups involved in
the Partnership, charge that the BDP Strategy only protects "rock and ice"
as wilderness, which is de facto protected because there is little timber
value to these lands and much is inaccessible due to steep slopes or other
topography. 9' At the same time, the Strategy would put much of the low
elevation forests into the suitable timber base, thereby relinquishing wildlands with higher ecological value. Once wilderness qualities are lost by
road building or logging, these remaining unprotected wildlands can never
be designated wilderness in the future. Additionally, logging would be
allowed on 200,000 acres of currently inventoried roadless areas. 92 The
release of these unprotected wildlands would be bad for the ecological sustainability of the forest.
An alternative wilderness bill is the Northern Rockies Ecosystem Protection Act (NREPA) (H.R. 1975), which would designate nearly seven million acres of wilderness in Montana. There is robust debate regarding the
political viability of NREPA, but it does serve as a point of comparison
with the BDP Bill. Whether a smaller scale incremental approach with
local support is more likely to be passed by Congress than a larger scale
comprehensive wilderness bill is open to speculation. 93 But NREPA would
protect significantly more wildlands in Montana without releasing wilderness-quality wildlands to development.
Ultimately, additional wilderness designation advances ecological protections for the forest. But at what cost? Whether this particular wilderness
approach gives up too much potential wilderness, is too piecemeal in light
of other approaches, or wastes political capital that is developing for more
ambitious wilderness designations are the key issues to consider in evaluating the substantive success of the wilderness component of the Partnership
Strategy. 94
2. Restoration and Stewardship Contracting
Another primary objective of the BDP Strategy is to put Montanans to
work by producing wood products using restoration forestry, including activities that fix damaged habitat and recreational areas. Proponents of the
BDP Strategy note that uncertainty regarding public lands logging plagues
local timber companies, which threatens local economies. The Strategy
91. Eve Byron, Conflict Marks MWA Anniversary, Helena Independent Record (April 20, 2008);
George Wuerthner, The Problems with the Beaverhead-Deerlodge Partnership 2 http:/Iwww.
bhdlpartnership.org/PDFs/Critics-Wuerthner-Document- 11-20-07.pdf (Nov. 20, 2007).

92. Wuerthner, supra n. 91, at 2; but see Bruce Farling & Tom France, Why George Wuerthner is
Wrong about the Beaverhead-Deerlodge Partnership 2, http://www.bhdlpartnership.org/PDFs/CriticsWuerthnerResponseFinal-sjs.pdf (accessed May 15, 2008) (arguing that "the bulk are slivers next to
existing road systems, including tracts that though classified as 'roadless,' actually have roads").
93. See Tim Baker and Michael Garrity, Ending the Wilderness Drought, http:llwww.
newwest.net/topic/article/19602/C41/L4 1/ (Feb. 22, 2008).

94.

Id.

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

aims to fix this problem by putting local timber companies back to work on
our public lands. 95 To meet this goal, the Bill designates 2,272,000 acres of
stewardship areas on the forest, with nearly 700,000 acres managed as landscape- scale restoration projects. 96
The Bill mandates at least one "landscape-scale restoration project" annually, 97 creating a binding legal duty to "mechanically treat timber" on
7,000 acres annually. 98 The Strategy aims to assure a continuous supply of
timber for local logging interests, while also meeting certain restoration
requirements. 99 All of these restoration goals are to be facilitated by using
stewardship contracts for the required landscape-scale restoration projects. 1°° For a national forest with its share of abusive management, this
restoration mandate sounds like good news.
However, stewardship contracting is not necessarily the restoration panacea described. One critic notes that the goal of sustaining the economic
viability of the timber industry is inconsistent with restoration: "even good
faith efforts to manage the forest for ecological restoration will be fatally
flawed and under pressure to get the cut out."'' ° Critics also doubt that
stewardship contracting can raise enough money to fund the required restoration work, especially on a dryland forest that typically loses money on its
timber program. George Wuerthner, an outspoken environmental writer
comments:
What we question is whether the Beaverhead-Deerlodge
National Forest is the appropriate place for any commercial
timber production. The forests on the BDNF grow slowly
and trees are small. It's questionable whether logging-if
all costs were considered-can be done economically (and
ecologically) anyplace on the BDNF. Only by ignoring
most of the real costs can anyone
assert that it makes any
02
economic sense to log here.1

95. Ecosystem Research Group, Partnership Strategy for the Beaverhead-Deerlodge National
Forest 1-6, http://www.bhdlpartnership.org/PDFs/Proposal-FinalPartnershipStrategy.4.14.06.pdf (April
14,2006).
96. BDP Bill, supra n. 84, at § 101(a).
97. Id. at § 102(a).
98. Id. at § 102(d).
99. Id. at § 102(c) (restoration requirements include: I) limiting permanent road densities to below
1.5 miles per square mile; 2) making new access roads temporary; 3) reclaiming certain existing roads;
4) managing vegetation by timber harvests and prescribed bums; 5) replacing and resizing existing
culverts to reduce sediments and restore fish habitat; 6) restoring wildlife habitat by mechanical treatment and prescribed burning 7) applying Inland Native Fish Strategy (INFISH) standards for riparian
habitat conservation and management; 8) utilizing commercial timber harvests to reduce fire and insect
risks, restore healthy forests, produce revenue for habitat restoration, and provide economic stability to
local communities by maintaining wood products infrastructure).
100. Id. at § 102(b).
101. Wuerthner, supra n. 92, at I.
102. Id. at 2-3.
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Another critic claims that on the BDNF, "the American taxpayer loses
about $1,400 per acre of forest cut down. It will cost taxpayers
$280,000,000 to log these roadless lands.
Money-losing timber sales don't
03
raise any money for restoration work.'
Furthermore, stewardship contracting is a contracting tool, not a planning
tool, which raises additional questions as to how it will be applied. The
Forest Service expressed concern that because stewardship contracting requires periodic congressional reauthorization, it would be inappropriate to
require all vegetation projects under a forest plan to require the use of such
an uncertain tool.' °4 Additionally, the Forest Service noted that "to generate enough funds through stewardship contracting to achieve the results
described by the Partnership would require a tremendous amount of timber
harvest. There is no science or other information presented by the Partnership on how resource values would
or could be protected from such a large
'0 5
unprecedented harvest program."
Some critics fear that there are no assurances that the restoration work
will accompany the timber "treatment." The Burned Area Recovery settlement on the Bitterroot National Forest tells a cautionary tale. Restoration
work was supposed to accompany the permitted logging, but while most
logging was completed within a few years, the restoration work has barely
begun and funding is elusive.' °6
So the question becomes whether stewardship contracting can generate
the funding needed for road removals and other restoration work that
should follow the timber "treatment." Without answering these practical
concerns, the BDP Strategy is just more logging dressed in restoration
rhetoric. Many foresters believe that unhealthy forests need thinning and
other "treatment" for ecological health. However, honest debate would
address the underlying science in an open and accountable setting, rather
than packaging timber harvests as restoration. Additionally, the Bill mandates timber treatment at a speed and scope that makes monitoring and
evaluation of the Strategy's effectiveness difficult. Over 10 years, 70,000
acres of forest will be mechanically treated in 10 different landscape-scale
restoration projects. Although the Forest Service would be required to report to Congress at five year intervals,' 0 7 there is good reason to question
how much data will be available over the short-term to allow effective and
accurate adaptive management to meet changing ecological needs. Given
the binding targets for timber treatment, there is no indication that adaptive
management is even appropriate for a Strategy that seeks certainty through
103. Michael Garrity, AWR, Green Scamners Ad, http://www.bhdlpartnership.orgfPDFs/CriticsIndependantAdRant.pdf (May 11, 2006).
104. BDNF FEIS, supra n. 90, at 954.
105. Id. at 965.
106. See Daryl Gadbow, Furor Over Forest Restoration Front and Center, Missoulian (Feb. 2,
2005).
107. BDP Bill, supra n. 84, at § 104(a).
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yearly landscape scale restoration projects that would affect 70,000 acres of
forest before a second congressional report could present
sufficient data to
08
track trends and gauge successes in ecological terms.
There are additional concerns that such "restoration projects" are not
economical for timber companies that would have to retrofit mills to process smaller diameter trees and adapt to new markets that might not provide
the same profit margins as past logging. Thus, the bad news is that stewardship contracting might not prove to be the restoration tool described,
while the economic certainty is less than certain.
A final analysis can only be made in retrospect, but past failed efforts
advise caution. While restoration forestry is certainly an ecological improvement over large scale commercial timber harvests, the ability of stewardship contracting to deliver the goods has yet to be proven. Unfortunately, the Partnership Strategy invests all of its hopes in the ability of
stewardship contracting to provide economic stability to timber companies,
restore damaged forests, and provide all the requisite funding for these efforts. Rather than test these admirable goals with a slower pilot approach,
the Strategy mandates 70,000 acres of treatment over 10 years from a suitable timber base of 2,272,000 acres of stewardship areas. In contrast, the
Forest Service's preferred alternative recommends 299,000 acres as suitable
for timber production and does not have a mandate for yearly landscape-°9
scale treatments, although timber harvest goals are included in board feet.'
In explaining some of the reasons for not fully analyzing the Partnership
Strategy during forest planning, the Forest Service noted that "[h]istorically
harvesting to the degree proposed by the Partnership has been shown to
adversely affect threatened, endangered, and sensitive species and degrade
water quality."' 10 Thus, despite the potential to redirect forest management
in a more ecologically sustainable manner, the Strategy's approach may be
too much, too fast, with too little proof of achieving its stated goals.
3. Relationship to Other Laws
An additional substantive issue of concern is the BDP Bill's relationship
to other laws. The Bill directly addresses this issue by declaring: "Except
as provided for in this Act, the Secretary shall manage the BeaverheadDeerlodge National Forest in accordance with all existing laws and regulations."'' Recall that the Quincy Library legislation was altered by Congress to include language explicitly requiring the pilot project to adhere to
all federal environmental laws. Here the "except as provided for in this
Act" language gives marching orders to the Forest Service to implement the
108.

Id.

109. BDNF FEIS, supran. 90, at tbl. 1.
110. Id. at 36.
111.

BDP Bill, supra n. 84, at § 106.
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BDP Strategy regardless of conflicting ecological mandates for the forest.
The most obvious conflict is with the roadless rule. While the fate of the
roadless rule is battled in court, the BDP Strategy would open some
roadless areas on the Beaverhead-Deerlodge to "temporary roads."
Direct conflicts with other environmental laws raise additional questions
about the effect of this statutory language.. If the Strategy could only be
implemented by ignoring the Endangered Species Act or the Clean Water
Act, a judge could be left to interpret whether the "except as provided" language gives the BDP Strategy primacy over other environmental laws.
Whether this conflict is likely to occur does not diminish this critique of
place-based legislation undermining federal environmental protections. In
fact, this concern is reinforced by the Forest Service's response to the Partnership Strategy's forest management approach:
It would be presumptuous for the forest to think that large
scale timber harvest is the answer to restoring all watersheds. The Partnership Strategy is proposing to harvest
over 7000 acres a year in one or two watersheds (15,000 to
40,000 acres) or approximately 17 to 47 percent of a watershed with large cutting units. This wholesale strategy
would violate 36 CFR 219.27 (d) (2), which identifies a 40
acre harvest opening limit for all vegetation types on the
BDNF. It is only after site-specific analysis, identifying
specific rationale, that the Forest may exceed these size
openings. We agree there are times where this strategy is
desirable, but there is not enough site-specific information
to support a forest wide strategy to harvest large acreages
within watersheds. After consideration, the ID Team determined there are too many unknowns, and little if any science, which indicates the Partnership Strategy could be implemented successfully, while protecting the other resource
values. In fact, the ID Team felt there is more science indicating that given the current condition of the BDNF, existing laws, and regulations, treating large acres in individual
watersheds across the forest could not be accomplished
without adversely effecting resources to the degree that legal requirements like the Clean Water Act, Endangered
Species Act, National Historic Preservation Act, and National Forest Management Act would be violated. The
Partnership has presented no information, specific to the
BDNF, indicating how their strategy would protect the re-
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sources
and meet the legal framework identified in the
112

EIS.

The Strategy also raises intriguing NEPA questions. The Bill requires
one EIS for each landscape-scale restoration project.1 3 The Strategy shifts
the terms of any NEPA challenge, since landscape scale treatments are
framed as restoration projects, rather than timber harvests. Furthermore,
the mainstream conservation groups involved in the Partnership are likely
to defend any such restoration projects challenged, further raising the bar
for a successful NEPA challenge. Many would view this as a good development, since NEPA litigation is often cited as one of the contributions to
gridlock on the national forests. This Strategy would tilt the scales in favor
of timber treatment because such treatment would arguably have positive
environmental impacts. Questions may remain as to whether the Strategy
constrains alternatives available for the Forest Service to consider in its
NEPA analysis and whether this creates a sufficient opportunity to seek
judicial review of specific stewardship projects. Regardless, the Strategy
would alter the NEPA debate significantly.
B. ProceduralIssues
The procedural issues underlying the BDP are equally important to an
evaluation of the Partnership as a collaborative tool for advancing environmental goals on public lands.
1. Collaborationor Negotiation?
Proponents of the BDP Strategy extol how a collaborative process overcame gridlock and produced a non-traditional alliance that advanced multiple interests. Many involved in the BDP note how trust and credibility have
been gained through the process. As noted above, the Partnership made
extensive outreach efforts to promote its Strategy and gained many supporters. According to the Partners: "Over the last year we've talked to other
Montanans about our efforts, building support for what we're doing, and
modifying our proposal to reflect these constructive discussions. We are
still talking with others and we stand ready to make further adjustments as
we learn more."' 14

Critics cry foul. Noting that three mainstream conservation organizations met privately with five timber companies to hammer out the details of
the deal without seeking or even allowing broader participation, these critics question the legitimacy of the process. The Alliance for the Wild Rock112.
113.

BDNF FEIS, supran. 90, at 953.
BDP Bill, supra n. 84, at § 102(e).

114. Ed Regan and Tim Baker, Breaking Free of Forest Service Gridlock, Butte Standard op-ed
(April 24, 2007).
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ies even placed an ad in the Missoula Independent calling the Partnership
"Green Scammers" and leading with the accusation that "[b]ehind closed
doors, self-appointed interlopers sold out your Beaverhead-Deerlodge National Forest!"' 15
Criticism comes from inside the BDP conservation groups as well. Former MWA board member Paul Edwards expressed concern with the BDP
Strategy: "I appreciate MWA's anxiety and misery with the endless rejection of (new wilderness designations), but I don't think the answer is to
collaborate with those who have no desire to see wilderness preserved for
its own sake .... I think they've made a deal with the devil."' 16 Russ Titus,
a 20-year MWA member, believes the deal, which was "totally hatched in
quiet," undermines efforts of conservation groups. 17 Titus wrote to the
MWA board:
By collaborating with five sawmills and two conservation
groups not seriously concerned with wilderness designation, MWA ...[is] seeking fast and painless wilderness to-

kens at the cost of the most essential element of the wilderness ethic: working and sweating for wilderness support
among the people that live near it.
...Does MWA intend to continue the current practice of
collaborating with any partner offering to help gain wilderness designation in its area of commercial operations in return for our help in gaining access to saw timber in that
area?" 18
Such an exclusionary process is more akin to a negotiation than a true
collaboration. The Collaboration Best Practices for the Conservation
Community specifically states that collaboration does not include
"[n]egotiated political deals (i.e. public land legislation), behind closed
doors deal making, or other processes that are not open, transparent, and
strive to be inclusive ...119 Indeed much of the literature on collaboration
places open process and accountability high on the list of required characteristics for a true collaborative process. 2 °0 Some conservationists describe
BDP "outreach" efforts more as information sessions than legitimate efforts
to seek input. This is not to argue that the Partnership's Strategy does not
represent a meaningful negotiation; however, it should be recognized as
such, rather than holding itself out as a collaborative effort. The Strategy
115. AWR, Green Scammers Ad, http://www.bhdipartnership.org/PDFs/Critics-independantAdRant.
pdf (May 11,2006).
116. Byron, supra n. 91.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Best Practices,supran.12, at 2.
120. Id.; Keiter, supra n.7, at 248-249.
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may represent a viable political solution to agency gridlock because of its
non-traditional support, but in terms of collaborative principles of openness,
inclusiveness, and representing diverse interests, the Partnership falls short
of true collaboration.' 2 '
Accountability is a key collaborative criterion. The Partnership's outreach efforts attempt to build support and accountability for the Strategy.
But this approach is backwards. Since the actual negotiations were exclusive between two primary interests, many critics view the Partnership as
unrepresentative and unaccountable.
2. Legislation v. Forest Planning
The BDP was born of frustration with forest planning. Many collaborative efforts arose from similar frustrations with agency processes that failed
to deliver the goods that local communities desired. However, while the
BDP began pursuing legislation to implement its Strategy, the Forest Service continued its forest planning. The result is that parallel tracks are moving towards the goal of implementing their visions for the future of the forest. Members of the BDP have played both angles, submitting comments
on the FEIS, while still pursuing congressional action to directly implement
their Strategy. This raises fundamental questions about the legitimacy of
either approach. Is this just strategic planning to take multiple approaches
to implementing their Strategy, or does it show a lack of faith in public
process?
The Forest Service is clearly frustrated by the Partnership's approach.
Noting that parts of the Strategy are illegal or inappropriate for a forest plan
and that the Strategy lacks sufficient information to fully consider it as an
alternative in the EIS, the Service comments:
These items have been pointed out to the Partnership and a
request for changes and additional information to make the
alternative viable. After a year of discussions with the
Partnership, we have neither received information changing
those items which are inappropriate, nor have we received
information to make it a complete alternative, which could
be analyzed similar to the other alternatives. The Partnership has stated they would provide us with information, but
none has been received. Therefore the Partnership Strategy
has been dropped from consideration as an alternative in
the planning process; however elements of the proposal
will be considered as individual comments...22

121.
122.

Best Practices, supra n. 12, at 2; Keiter, supra n. 7, at 248-249.
BDNF FEIS, supra n. 90, at 957.
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Whatever frustration the Partnership had with the Forest Service during
forest planning is obviously mutual.
If the Forest Service does not implement the BDP Strategy through forest
planning, which seems likely given the FEIS, the follow-up question is
whether the BDP Bill will fare better in Congress. This question cannot be
answered with any certainty. As discussed above, successful collaborative
public lands legislation benefits from strong political leadership on complex
conflicts not adequately resolved through administrative processes. 23 The
Bill is a response to frustrations with forest planning and enjoys support
from Governor Schweitzer and Senator Baucus, which is the type of leadership that could facilitate its passage. However, these strengths are undermined by the Partners' failure to deliberate compromise among diverse
interests before pursuing legislation.' 24 Furthermore, regardless of what the
BDP proposed, the final legislation could look much different from the current Bill after making it through the proverbial congressional sausage
grinder. Congress may add provisions explicitly addressing the Bill's relationship to other laws, as with the Quincy Library legislation. This point
must fall in the ugly column since it is impossible to know whether Congress will improve upon the faults in the Bill or undermine its strengths.
Congress may offer some additional legitimacy to the process. By moving the debate to the political arena, the process should be opened to greater
input and debate, unless the Bill ends up in a legislative rider. While questions remain as to whether the Bill is a result of a genuine collaboration, at
least the exclusionary taint could be tempered by moving the discussion
into the political sphere.
3. National v. Local
The national versus local debate is one that has plagued collaborative efforts to address public lands management. While some critics like Coggins
and McCloskey argue that any devolution of decision-making authority to
local groups undermines the national interest in public lands, others see
local involvement as a more informed approach to on-the-ground circumstances. The Partnership's interest in creating certainty for local timber
companies represents a different perspective from national conservation
groups that participate in forest management through agency processes
within the framework of federal environmental laws. Although the Partnership does include two national conservation groups, they are both represented by regional offices and local leadership. In addition to legal concerns about delegation of authority, this type of place-based legislation also
raises questions about piecemeal forest management. While far from perfect, federal environmental legislation offers a uniform approach to manag123.

Western Governors' Association, supra n. 37, at 31-32.

124.

Id.
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ing public lands, which allows
a wide array of interests to participate in
25
established agency processes.
Coggins would take this argument a step further to question whether the
Partnership is a mask for cooptation that interferes with national priorities.126 Timber companies have consistently blamed environmentalists for
locking up forests through litigation, which suggests that this "collaborative" effort may simply be a better strategy for accessing more timber and
avoiding more radical reforms that could result from forest planning or continued litigation. By emphasizing local economic needs to guide forest
management, the timber companies' involvement in the BDP subverts national forest planning efforts directed by national legislation.
4. Motorized Use
Increased motorized use on the Beaverhead-Deerlodge National Forest
was an impetus to form the Partnership's non-traditional alliance between
mainstream conservation groups and timber companies. While the Partnership Strategy addresses this issue, the Bill is silent on the matter. 127 Presumably, motorized use will remain an issue to be managed through forest
and travel planning. Punting on this issue may be political strategy, but it
leaves a critical aspect of the forest conflict unresolved.
5. Resource Advisory Committee
The BDP Bill requires a Resource Advisory Committee (RAC) for the
BDNF with Partnership representatives from both the conservation and
industry interests. 128 This RAC must establish "project specific advisory
committees, comprised of industry, recreation, conservation, and livestock
interests, to aid in the location, design, and implementation of the landscape
projects" required by the Bill. 29 The nepotistic mandate to install Partnership interests on the RAC, combined with the RAC's subdelegation to project specific advisory committees to "aid" in "locating, designing, and implementing" landscape projects raises serious questions about the ultimate
role of the Partnership in forest decision-making. While both the RAC and
the project-specific advisory committees still retain an advisory role, this
provision appears to be an effort to push the boundaries of the Partnership's
advisory role. Congressional enactment of the Bill would likely avoid legal
subdelegation issues, but this provision could complicate implementation of
the Strategy. The Bill even requires the RAC to advise the BDNF on "the
125. Coggins, supra n. 52, at 610; Coggins, Across the Great Divide, supra n. 59, at 170-171;
McCloskey, supra n. 73, at 432-434.
126. Coggins, Across the Great Divide, supra n. 59, at 167-170; Coggins, supra n. 52, at 607-608.
127. Ecosystem Research Group, supra n. 95, at 9; BDP Bill, supra n.84.
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use and disbursement of excess receipts which result from the completion
of the landscape scale restoration projects." 130 This seems like a recipe for
institutionalized conflict with the Forest Service being given marching orders to consult with an advisory group that went over its head to implement
its Strategy after failing to get its way through forest planning.
VI. TOWARDS

A MORE COLLABORATIVE FUTURE?

It is too early to render a final verdict on the Beaverhead-Deerlodge Partnership. This analysis illustrates some of the good, bad, and ugly aspects of
the BDP Strategy. Substantively, success depends on whether the Strategy
is ever implemented, by Congress or administratively, and in what final
form. Key issues to evaluate substantive success will be the amount of designated wilderness, the scientifically demonstrated effects of restoration
work, and the legal relationship of the BDP Strategy to other environmental
laws. Procedurally, the Partnership has a mixed record with regard to some
principles of collaboration. The BDP was not an open and inclusive process that welcomed diverse interests to the table. The Partnership improves
some on accountability flaws through its outreach efforts and by subjecting
the Strategy to the political process, although these are tail-end efforts,
rather than genuine, up-front efforts.
Genuine collaboration would require taking several steps back and inviting a broader spectrum of interests to the table to discuss management of
the forest. The Strategy could represent a starting point for that discussion,
but a true collaboration would require an open process that strives for
greater accountability among the representatives and their constituents.
This could build broader trust, credibility, and accountability. However, it
also runs the risk of leading to more conflict without resolution. A genuine
collaborative process has its own shortcomings, and a successful process
does not guarantee a successful result.
While the Partnership may fail as a collaboration, that does not make it a
failure in general. The Partnership is more aptly described as a negotiation
between three mainstream conservation groups and five local timber companies. As such, it did produce an impressive agreement that succeeded in
building on common ground between those interests. The Strategy would
provide some environmental and economic benefits for the forest and surrounding communities. While it might not go far enough for some environmental critics, it does represent an appealing political agreement that
could move the forest in a positive direction. As a political compromise it
will never represent all interests, but what compromise could?
Collaboration is an evolving tool. It is not the answer for all public lands
problems. True collaborations go a long way towards building understanding between diverse interests, and finding creative solutions where tradi130.
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tional approaches breed more conflict. The Beaverhead-Deerlodge Partnership is a cautious compromise between traditional administrative approaches and genuine collaboration. That it fails to benefit fully from either
approach is less a condemnation of its efforts than an assessment of its
shortcomings.

